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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Katherine Smith appeals from the district court's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order wherein the district court denied Ms. Smith post-conviction relief.
Ms. Smith appeals the district court's order summarily dismissing her claim that she
received ineffective assistance of counsel, resulting in her plea being not knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently entered. As a result, she asks this Court to reverse the
district court's order summarily dismissing this case and remand the matter for further
proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Smith filed a timely Petition for Post-Conviction relief.

(R., pp.4-7.)

asserted several claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel. 1

She

(R., pp.4-7.)

Relevant to this appeal, Ms. Smith asserted that due to her attorney's deficient
performance, she entered into an unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary plea at the
arraignment. (R., pp.16-18.) Ms. Smith seeks to withdraw her guilty plea and proceed
forward to trial; wherein, she contends she has good defenses to the charges.
(R., pp.6, 24.) Ms. Smith contends she is innocent. (Tr., p.144, Ls.20-23, p.144, Ls.1217.)
Ms. Smith asserted that her attorney accepted a retainer months before the State
filed charges. (R., p.16.) At the time of retaining her attorney, she provided him checks,
cash receipts, register receipts, and other evidence to assist her defense. (R., p.16.)
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Although Ms. Smith raised several claims in her petition, counsel is only addressing
the claim relevant to the issue being raised in this appeal.

1

Ms. Smith contends that the trial attorney failed to properly review the evidence she
provided prior to making false promises and coercing her into a plea agreement.
{R., pp.16, 25.)
Ms. Smith contends that her attorney promised probation and insured her that
the State would not prosecute her daughter and husband. (R., pp.16, 18.) Specifically,
Ms. Smith claimed, "Mr. Martens made the false promise of three (3) years probation
with a withheld judgment. At no time did Mr. Martens say that tr1is was his opinion. He
stated it as a fact to Mr. and Mrs. Smith." (R., p.18.) In an attempt to clarify her claim to
the state bar, Ms. Smith asserted, "At no time have I claimed he forced me to do
anything. What I said is that if I had been properly informed, with the truth, I would not
have proceeded the way he wanted." {R., p.42.)
Ms. Smith also filed a copy of her state bar complaint. (R., pp.20-28.) In her
complaint, she asserted that her attorney told her at a hearing that he had a deal
worked out

(R., p.23.)

According to Ms. Smith, if she pied guilty to three of the

charges, she would receive three years probation.

(R., p.23.)

The State agreed to

dismiss the remaining seven counts and have her immediately released from jail on her
own recognizance. (R., p.23.) Ms. Smith also stated that when she told her attorney
that she did not understand, he told her that he would tell her how to respond to the
court's questions. (R., p.23.) Ms. Smith recalled that during the hearing, because she
did not understand why she was pleading to certain offenses that she had proof of her
innocence, she stopped the judge and asked questions of her trial attorney. (R., p.23;
Tr.04/02/2004, p.12, Ls.10-20.) Her attorney's response was that it was not relevant
and that she would not go home today if she objected to the plea. (R., p.23.)
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In a written response to the state bar, the trial attorney stated:
I was of the opinion that she would receive no jail time, the Judge would
give her probation and time served leaving her on probation for three
years fixed and five indeterminate. Sentencing was open, so I could only
give Mrs. Smith my opinion and what I believed her sentence would be. I
did qualify my opinion to Mrs. Smith. I explained to her that everything
depended on the pre-sentence investigation, so it was important that the
report come back good.
(R., p.35.) Ms. Smith takes issue with the trial attorney's qualification that his advice to

her was presented to her as only an opinion. (R., pp.42-43.)
The State filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(R., pp.157-160) and an Amended Notice (R., pp.161-164). The district court conducted

a hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal on May 29, 2009. (R., pp.175182.) After hearing argument, the district court dismissed all but one of Ms. Smith's
claims. (R., pp.183-184.) Ms. Smith's claim on appeal that her plea was not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered due to ineffective assistance of counsel was
summarily dismissed by the court. (R., pp.183-184.)
The district court conducted a hearing on the one remaining claim involving
whether Ms. Smith received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney
allegedly instructed her to leave the sentencing hearing. (R., pp.191-195.) The district
court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R., pp.198-206.) Pursuant to the
prisoner mailbox rule, Ms. Smith filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.207-210, 228.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Ms. Smith's claim that her plea
was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because it was the result of
ineffective assistance of counsel?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Ms. Smith's Claim That Her Plea
Was Not Entered Knowingly, Intelligently, Or Voluntarily Because It Was The Result Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

A.

Introduction
Ms. Smith asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed her

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in her unknowing, unintelligent, and
involuntary plea. Ms. Smith presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Ms. Smith respectfully requests that the
district court's order summarily dismissing her ineffective assistance of counsel claim
involving her guilty plea be vacated, and this case remanded to the district court for an
evidentiary hearing.

B.

Applicable Legal Standards

1.

Summary Dismissal Standards

An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State,
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903.
The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id.
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for relief when the court is satisfied
the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by further
proceedings. I.C. § 19-4906(b). In considering summary dismissal in a case where
evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate, despite the
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possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be responsible for
resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,
444 (2008) (addressing the case where State did not file a response to petition) (citing

Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 (1982) (addressing the case with
stipulated facts)). However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required to accept
the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but need not accept the
petitioner's conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there exists a
material issue of fact. I.C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that
would entitle the applicant to relief, if resolved in the applicant's favor, summary
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.

Baldwin v.

State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008).
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho 903
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de nova. Owen v.

State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997).
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2.

Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Standards

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of
counsel.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984).

Further, the

Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685.
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the
Amendment envisions." Id.

The "proper measure of attorney performance remains

simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court
has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the
American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function.
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279 (1998).

In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also
must prove that he was prejudiced.

"The defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
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outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different,"
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that ··· the result of the
proceeding would have been different."
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).
Despite the general rule, a presumption of prejudice arises in certain instances.
This presumption applies when there is a complete denial of counsel during a critical
stage of the proceedings, when circumstances are such that the likelihood that any
lawyer could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is
appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial, and when counsel entirely
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing.

See e.g.,

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,659 (1984).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Ms. Smith's Claim That
Her Plea Was Not Entered Knowingly, Intelligently, Or Voluntarily Because It
Was The Result Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Ms. Smith asserted that her plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily

entered because it was the product of her attorney's failure to investigate, failure to
pursue defenses to the charge, threats of family member's prosecution, and untrue
promises about the plea bargain.

{R., pp.4-7, 16-18, 23, 25, 42.)
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The district court

dismissed this claim after the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss. (R., pp.183184.) The court determined that even if the attorney improperly advised Ms. Smith
about the potential consequences of her plea, the district court judge was so complete
and thorough at the change of plea hearing, Ms. Smith could never prove a claim that
her plea was not knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily entered.

(Tr.05/29/2009, p.83,

L.10 - p.82, L7.)
Ms. Smith submits that the district court erred when it relied upon the records of
the taking of her guilty plea, to the exclusion of other evidence regarding the
circumstances of the entry of the plea, to determine that the plea was knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered. When all the evidence is considered, Ms. Smith
did offer sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
her plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered such that she is entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on this claim.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, "It is elementary that a
coerced plea is open to collateral attack." Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215
(1973). This is true even when a petitioner bases his claims on things that occurred
prior to the taking of the plea and informed the court, at the time the plea was entered,
that it was "given voluntarily and knowingly, that he understood the nature of the charge
and the consequences of the plea, and that he was in fact guilty." Id. at 213-214.
Although the objective of following Idaho Criminal Rule 11 procedures is to flush out and
resolve issues regarding the plea, "like any procedural mechanism, its exercise is
neither always perfect nor uniformly invulnerable to subsequent challenge calling for an
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opportunity to prove the allegations" of coercion. Cf. Id. at 215 (addressing Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11 ).
Although the record of guilty plea proceedings is relevant to a subsequent claim
that the plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily, "the barrier of the
plea

or

sentencing

insurmountable."

proceeding

record,

although

imposing,

is

not invariably

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (U.S.N.C. 1977).

In

administering the writ of habeas corpus:
federal courts cannot fairly adopt a per se rule excluding all possibility that
a defendant's representations at the time his guilty plea was accepted
were so much the product of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or
misrepresentation by others as to make the guilty plea a constitutionally
inadequate basis for imprisonment.
Id. at 75. This Court sees the "Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act as an expansion

of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and not as a denial of the same." See Dionne v. State, 93
Idaho 235, 237 (1969). In addressing post conviction claims regarding the nature of a
plea, this Court has not adopted a per se rule limiting review to the record of the
proceedings at which the plea was taken, to the exclusion of additional evidence of what
led to the entry of the plea. See McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847 (2004) (considering
evidence outside of the written plea agreement to determine whether plea was entered
as the result of ineffective assistance of counsel).
In limiting its consideration of whether Ms. Smith entered a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary plea to the record of the taking of the plea, to the exclusion of other
evidence in the post conviction record regarding the circumstances of the entry of the
plea, the district court erred.
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The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that a claim that a guilty
plea is invalid because it was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered into may

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771

be raised in a post-conviction petition.
(1970).

Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea
process and enters her plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness
of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice "was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763
(1970). As we explained in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct.
1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), a defendant who pleads guilty upon the
advice of counsel "may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character
of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was
not within the standards set forth in McMann." Id., at 267, 93 S.Ct., at
1608.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985).
Taking Ms. Smith's factual allegations as true, the advice counsel gave to
Ms. Smith regarding entering a plea was not within the range of competence demanded
of attorneys in a criminal case. Ms. Smith asserted that her attorney told her that if "she
did not plead guilty and do exactly as he instructed, that Mr. Smith [her husband at the
time] and her daughter were going to be charged with various charges." (R., p.16.) The
prosecutor does not dispute that this threat could have been made by the attorney.
(R., p.148.) The State argues that the threat could not undermine a guilty plea because
it could be a matter of the attorney's opinion or a matter of "simple truth." (R., p.148.)
However, threats that one daughter and/or husband will be going to jail certainly does
raise a question of whether the plea was voluntarily entered into. Threats of harm to a
family member certainly could undermine whether a plea was voluntarily entered into
and this issue should have proceeded forward to an evidentiary hearing.
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Ms. Smith also asserted that her attorney made false promises about the plea
bargain. (R., p.18.) She alleged that he told her that she would receive three years
probation with a withheld judgment.

(R., p.18.)

In further elaboration to the bar

association, Ms. Smith explained that:
Jared Martens told me that he had a deal worked out because this was
the best that I could hope for. The deal was told to me as follows = I
would be released on O.R., they would drop 7 of the 10 if I would plead to
the remaining 3, no jail time and three years probation. I told Jared
Martens that I did not understand and he told me that he would tell me
how to answer. At some point[,] I stopped the judge and tried to ask Jared
Martens why he had me pleading guilty to charges that I have proof of and
he told me "that isn't relevant now, just do as I told you or you won't go
home today."
(R., p.23 (emphasis added).)

In review of the change of plea hearing transcript,

Ms. Smith did in fact try to stop the hearing.

(Tr.04/02/2004, p.12, Ls.15-23.)

She

discussed the matter with her attorney and when questioning resumed, she answered
accordingly.

(Tr.04/02/2004, p.12, Ls.18-23.)

Ms. Smith had already been informed

that she had better do as the attorney said or her family members would be prosecuted.
(R., p.16.)

Ms. Smith also indicated that her attorney promised her a withheld judgment and
three years probation.

{R., pp.16, 23.) The attorney's opinion of the plea bargain is

interesting. {R., p.35.) In a formal response to the State Bar Association, he claims that
he thought, "she would receive no jail time, the Judge would give her probation and time
served leaving her on probation for three years fixed and five indeterminate." (R., p.35.)
First, Ms. Smith has presented a genuine issue of fact because she believed that her
attorney had a deal worked out, not as the attorney recalls that his "deal" offer was only
an opinion of the possible consequences.
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Second, the attorney's recitation of his

opinion is an illogical impossibility. There is no such thing as probation for "three years
fixed and five indeterminate." While certainly an underlying sentence of eight years is
possible, there is no such thing as a fixed and indeterminate probation. While, certainly
there may be a typographical error, it only further supports Ms. Smith's version of the
facts and that at a minimum she presented a material issue of fact that her plea was not
knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered. Moreover, the attorney's belief that the
result of the presentence investigation could change everything would be consistent
with either Ms. Smith's allegations and/or the attorney's denial of improper advice.
Ms. Smith also alleged that her attorney failed to properly advise her to plead
guilty because he did not review her discovery and determine whether or not she had
any legal defenses to the charges. (R., pp.25-26.) While the attorney claimed that he
reviewed the documents she provided approximately one year before she pied guilty, he
did not indicate whether he re-reviewed it, considered it in light of the State's discovery,
and considered Ms. Smith's defenses prior to suggesting that she plead guilty to the
charge. (R., pp.35, 38.) Essentially, the attorney's billing records reveal that he may
have reviewed the evidence on May 15, 2003, and nearly a year later reviewed the
State's evidence on March 17, 2004. (R., p.38.) It is highly questionable if the attorney
would remember all of the potential defenses from a case delivered to him a year prior
and keep that information mentally assessable when evaluating a case that a defendant
had full attentions of fighting. (R., p.38.)
Ms. Smith asserted that she was coerced by the attorney to plead guilty, she had
been given false promises about a plea bargain, had been threaten with family
member's prosecution, and instructed to say what the attorney wanted her to say.
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Taking the unrebutted factual assertions of Ms. Smith as true, as a result of counsel's
ineffective assistance of counsel in this case, counsel's advice to plead guilty was not
within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. As a result,
Ms. Smith's plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered. Thus, there is a
genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in Ms. Smith's favor, would entitle
Ms. Smith to relief such that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed this
claim.

CONCLUSION

Ms. Smith respectfully requests that the district court's order summarily
dismissing her claim be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 26 th day of March, 2012.

-·{\?'DIANE M. WALKER

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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